The choice of an appropriate e-commerce strategy for the listing in price comparison platforms (eBay, Amazon, and price search
engines) is crucial for the survival of online stores in B2C e-commerce business. We use a comprehensive dataset from the
Austrian price search engine geizhals.at to identify successful e-commerce strategies with regard to these listing decisions.
An e-commerce strategy is a set of choices including the listing decision, availability decision, and decisions on a price
path and shipping cost. We apply cluster analysis to identify the different strategies that have been used by online retailers.
Using various success measures such as revenue, clicks, market share, and the survival of firms, as dependent variables in
our regression analyses, we present causal evidence on the effectiveness of different e-commerce strategies.
The choice of an appropriate e-commerce strategy is crucial for the survival of online stores in B2C e-commerce business.
We use a comprehensive data set from the Austrian price search engine geizhals.at to identify successful e-commerce strategies.
An e-commerce strategy is a set of choices including the listing decision, availability decision, and decisions on price and
shipping cost. We apply cluster analysis to identify the different strategies that have been used by online retailers. Using
various success measures such as revenue, clicks, market share, and the survival of firms, as dependent variables in our regression
analyses, we present empirical evidence on the effectiveness of different e-commerce strategies.
To estimate the differential effects of increased product demand on the demand for labor before and during the recent economic
crisis, we use a combination of detailed employment data and the outcomes of public procurement auctions. We compare the employment
reactions of the winner of an auction with the employment reactions of the second ranked firm (i.e., the runner-up firm).
Assuming similar ex-ante winning probabilities for both firms, we view winning an auction as an exogenous shock to a firm's
production and its demand for labor. Detailed daily employment data cover almost 600 construction firms and over 2500 auctions
in Austria over the time period 2006 to 2009. Our main results show that the winning firm significantly increases labor demand
in the weeks following an auction but only in the years before the recent economic crisis. It employs about 80 workers (around
3 more after the auction than the runner-up firm. Most of the adjustment takes place within one month after the demand shock.
Winners predominantly fire fewer workers after winning than runner-up firms. In the crisis, however, firms do not employ more
workers than their competitors after winning an auction. There are no effects on wages. We view labor hoarding and productivity
improvements induced by the crisis as the most likely explanations for our findings. We also discuss implications for fiscal
and stimulus policy in the crisis.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of market power on the share of females in top management positions using data from a
market in which some firms have market power due to an institutionalized cartel. We investigate collegiate athletics and interpret
coaches as top-level managers or chief executive officers (CEOs). The causal link between market power and female employment
is established by exploiting the existence of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) as an exogenous shock. Our results show that
an increase in the market share has a negative effect on females relative to males among coaches. We interpret this as clear
evidence for Becker's (1957) theory on employer discrimination. Only firms operating in an oligopolistic or otherwise not
perfectly competitive environment can sustain a taste or cost of discrimination. Market power is necessary to let firms share
rents with their workers, which they do in a discriminatory way.
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase
in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine
the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply
after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates
not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.
In this paper, we assess the impact of competition, investment, and regulation on prices of mobile services in France. We
estimate hedonic price regressions using data on tariff plans offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in France
between May 2011 and December 2014. In this time period, the obtained quality‐adjusted price index decreased by about 42.8%
as compared to a decline in weighted average prices without quality‐adjustment of 8.7%. In a second step, we relate the quality‐adjusted
prices to a set of competition, investment, and regulation variables and find that the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators
was the main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment. Low‐cost tariffs without commitment which were
introduced to pre‐empt the entry of low‐cost competitor declined at the time of entry. Moreover, we find that regulation,
which is approximated by the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and data,
has a joint significant impact on quality‐adjusted prices. In percentage terms, competition is responsible for about 23.4%
of total price decline and investments in 4G for 56.1%. We conclude that the reduction in quality‐adjusted prices in the last
years was largely caused by competition between operators for a new 4G technology and by entry of a fourth low‐cost operator.
Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on
registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts,
we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (J Political Econ 72:44–61, 1964).
Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization
cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily
aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and
(sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write
legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.
The availability of affordable formal child care is an important determinant of the labour force participation of parents,
particularly of mothers, which is increasingly discussed. This paper examines the impact of child-care costs on the employment
rates of mothers with children younger than 12 years. Using data from the 1995 and 2002 Austrian Microcensus, combined with
administrative wage data from Austrian tax records, we estimate the impact of net wages and child-care costs on mothers’ employment
probabilities. In line with theoretical considerations and most of the empirical literature, we find a negative elasticity
of mothers’ employment rates to child-care costs as well as positive elasticity with regard to net wages. The point estimates
for the impact of net wages and child-care costs are of similar absolute size. Additionally, the empirical results indicate
that higher family income reduces the employment probability of mothers.